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The Virtual Life of Photography 
Sarah J. Kember 
The premise of this article is that although photography is proliferating and diversifying, 
we still do not know what it is. In order to find out what it is, we must look at it from both 
the outside and the inside: we must consider both the condition of photography, and its 
ontology. New media studies, science and technology studies, and other related fields, 
help to illuminate the condition of photography, or its exteriority. But it is philosophy 
which enables us to address, directly, and from the inside, the question of ontology. The 
article proposes that this ontology is one of becoming, not of Being, and that it can be 
understood through Bergson’s terms of memory and intuition. Memory, as an ontology of 
becoming, constitutes the virtual life of photography, and intuition, as a method of 
understanding, enables us to apprehend it.  
 
Introduction. What is Photography? 
I want to begin by returning to the editorial statement that introduced the first issue of this 
journal. This attempted to outline the current condition of photography with reference to an 
increasing diversity of practices, and a relative poverty of theory: 
If continuing proliferation, accelerated reinvention and transformation, of both dramatic 
and subtle kinds, are key phrases for describing contemporary photography, the range of 
disciplinary and conceptual frameworks available to us now needs to be joined by others.   
        (photographies 3) 
Photography did not die the death of digitisation predicted in the last decades of the 20
th century. 
Far from it: ‘there is now more photography, possibly of more kinds, than ever before’ (3). I will 
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not further explore the different kinds of photography, or photographies, here. Instead, I will 
attempt to indicate how photography, as a heterogeneous practice which is very much alive, 
differs in kind, not degree, from other media and technological forms which endure by constantly 
changing. In other words, I will address the following question: 
Why have the most recent phases of photography’s reinvention returned us yet again to 
the vexed question of its nature? 
(photographies 6) 
After more than one hundred and fifty years, we still do not know what photography is. The 
reason for this, I suggest, is indeed due to the deployment of a restricted range of disciplinary and 
conceptual frameworks – but only in part.  
 
In order to find out what photography is, it will be necessary to consider debates on new media, 
science and technology studies (STS) and philosophy. Where new media studies, STS, and other 
related fields help to illuminate the condition of photography – its role in a complex ecology or, 
if you like, its exterior environment – it is philosophy which helps us to address, directly and 
from the inside, the question of ontology. I propose that this ontology is one of becoming, not of 
Being, and that it can be understood through the terms of memory and intuition. Memory 
constitutes the object, or essence, of photography and intuition constitutes, in Bergson’s 
formulation, an ‘empirical’ method of aesthetic rather than scientific understanding.
1 Intuition, for 
Bergson, is at odds with the intellect. The intellect blocks our understanding of life and all things 
that move and change, including, I would add, photography. We have not understood what 
photography is, then, because we have relied too much on our intellects, never mind the 
constraints of specific disciplines.  
 
In his final piece of work, Camera Lucida, Barthes made a similar point when he declared his 
‘ultimate dissatisfaction’ with all critical languages and decided to make himself ‘the measure of 
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photographic “knowledge”’ ( 8-9). I will consider how his approach to the essence of 
photography, how his ‘“ontological” desire’ (3), might be reassessed through a comparison 
between intuition and affect, ontology and phenomenology, memory and perception.  
 
Applying intuition as a method, rather than ‘a feeling, an inspiration’ or ‘a disorderly sympathy’ 
(Deleuze 13) involves the use of certain acts, or rules. The first of these requires us to distinguish 
between true and false problems, since false problems obfuscate understanding. Coincidentally, 
for both Barthes and Bergson, the problem of realism which has so dominated debates on 
photography and philosophy respectively, is a false one. Bergson argues that realism, like its 
opposite, idealism (or as we might formulate it; constructionism), simply goes too far: ‘it is a 
mistake to reduce matter to the perception we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able 
to produce in us perceptions, but itself of another nature than they’ (Matter and Memory vii). 
Perhaps as a result of the historical separation between disciplines, it has taken contemporary 
thinkers a long time to catch up with this argument, and even now it can be said that the arts are 
predominantly idealist, while the sciences are predominantly realist. For Barthes, the problem of 
realism is part of the problem of classification, and classification is always external to the object 
of photography – ‘without relation to its essence’ (4). The various classifications of photography, 
including the aesthetic distinction between realism and pictorialism, can be applied to other forms 
of representation. From this, Barthes deduces that ‘photography is unclassifiable’ (4).  
 
Once he has removed the false problems by means of which ‘photography evades us’ (4), Barthes 
is able to approach the truth, or essence of photography. He expresses this in terms of the 
invisibility of the medium – ‘whatever it grants to vision and whatever its manner, a photograph 
is always invisible: it is not it that we see’ – and in terms of the ‘stubborness of the Referent’ (6). 
It is important to note that at this point, Barthes has shifted from a discussion of photography to a 
discussion of ‘the Photograph’. He asks that we accept this universal, for ‘convenience’s sake’, 
 3
and as one that refers ‘only to the tireless repetition of contingency’ (5). What he means by this is 
that the photograph ‘reproduces to infinity’ that which ‘has occurred only once’; namely, the 
event, the particular, the real. Significantly, he says that ‘the Photograph always leads the corpus I 
need back to the body I see’ (4). Which body does he see – it is not that of the photograph itself, 
since that is invisible – which ‘absolute Particular’, which ‘sovereign Contingency’? What does 
he encounter in ‘its indefatigable expression’? The answer is postponed in Camera Lucida, but it 
is provided. Barthes encounters his mother, after she has died. His grief causes him to look for 
her, and of course, he can only hope to find her in ‘this photograph, and not [in] Photography’ (4). 
Barthes adjures himself to ‘“get back to Photography”…’, but he cannot get past the ‘photograph 
I loved’, in which he sees ‘only the referent, the desired object, the beloved body’ (7). His search 
for the essence of this mother, supersedes, and overlays, his search for the essence of 
photography. It leads him to replace photography with the photograph, memory with the memory, 
virtual existence with actual existence, and ironically, perhaps, (her) life with (his) death.  
 
The second rule of intuition as a method requires us to distinguish between differences in degree, 
and differences in kind – or between false and true differences. Photographs can only be different 
in degree, but photography is a difference in kind. What makes it so is the existence, within 
photography, of memory. Memory, in the abstract, exists somewhere between the particular 
subject who remembers, and the particular object that stimulates the remembrance (Proust, and 
his madeleine). Memory, in the abstract, exists virtually – as a potential and endless reserve of 
actual memories – but its existence is real.
2 One of the false problems which dominates debates 
on photography, is the failure to distinguish between virtual memory and actual memories. 
Photography cannot be equated with, or reduced to, a supply of memories. That is simply how it 
is marketed. Photography neither fabricates nor fixes memories, and is therefore wrongly judged, 
when it is deemed to be either more, or less, than them. In fact, it is other than them. Another way 
 
of putting this would be to say that actual memories (like virtual memory) are real, they exist, but 
not in photography, and not, for that matter, in specific photographs either.  
 
Barthes’ photograph, the one he referred to as the Winter Garden Photograph, did not capture or 
create a memory of his mother. She was five years old at the time, and he, needless to say, was 
not there. What it does, is to actualise his memory of her (as an adult, as a parent) through a 
process, or perhaps a method, that he calls affect, and Bergson would call intuition. Neither affect 
nor intuition can be sustained. They do not last long. Momentarily, they bring the referent, the 
real, to life, but they do not reside in the image which, by conveying memory into perception (and 
thus actualising it), simultaneously conveys life into death, movement into stasis. Photographs 
(analogue or digital) do not move, and are not vital, but photography (analogue or digital) is. By 
pursuing a sequence of hermeneutic distinctions, in line with Bergson’s method 
(photography/photograph; virtual/actual; memory/perception), I will attempt to demonstrate how 
memory, as an ontology of becoming, constitutes the virtual life of photography, and how 
intuition enables us, however fleetingly, to connect with it.  
 
 
The Condition of Photography 
Intuition may afford us a privileged access to the ontology of photography, but there are two 
reasons why it remains relevant to consider photography from the outside. The first is that we 
cannot help but do this. Our primary mode of understanding is intellectual, not intuitive, and our 
intellects are dominated by the sense of sight. Thus, it is inevitable that we will continue to 
perceive the conditions of a medium that in turn is uniquely, if no longer mechanically, 
perceptual.
3 The theory of photography as-we-have-known-it,4 has been preoccupied with the 
conjunction of perception, representation, knowledge, power and subjectivity which Barthes 
ultimately assigned, or in fact, consigned, to the realm of the studium. The realm of the studium is 
 5
precisely that of the exterior environment – of ‘culture’ and nature – which provokes, in Barthes, 
‘only a general and, so to speak, polite interest’ (27), but no real desire. The studium engages, in 
Barthes, that disinterested interest that belongs to science and the intellect, but it is punctuated by 
a detail or partial object – in the Winter Garden Photograph it is the way in which his mother 
holds one of her fingers in her other hand – which shoots out of the image, and pierces him, 
stimulating both pain and longing. Barthes calls the element of the photograph which disturbs the 
studium, the punctum. Although the punctum itself is the key to Barthes’ phenomenology, the 
studium and the punctum always co-exist in a given photograph (42), and together they constitute 
the ‘two themes in Photography’ (27).  
 
Like Barthes, having distinguished two themes in photography – what he calls studium and 
punctum, and what I’m referring to as exteriority and interiority – I will occupy myself first with 
one, and then the other. However, the second reason for doing this, beyond that of necessity, has 
to do with their ultimate, and in fact original, co-existence. The condition of photography and the 
essence of photography will be separated (only) in order to be rejoined. The outcome, I hope, will 
be some indication, or example, of theory-as-it-could-be which, while bearing little resemblance 
to theory-as-we-know-it, by no means detaches itself from photography’s (own) past.  
 
Photography’s past is, of course, its own, and yet not its own. That is to say, the history of 
photography as a medium is the history of a visual technology and its social and economic uses. 
The debates on digitisation, in as far as they have survived into the 21
st century, tend to posit what 
Bergson would refer to as a ‘false evolution’ of photography, by attempting to separate it into its 
constituent parts – technological, social, economic – and by privileging the former. But 
photography is not divisible in this way, and a ‘true’ or ‘creative evolution’ of photography must 
start from this premise. As a medium which is simultaneously technological, social and 
economic, photography, like other media (we are dealing here with exteriority, and therefore with 
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differences in degree) can never really be new. Photography can never really be new, because 
new technologies do not necessarily create new uses; quantitative changes do not necessarily 
produce qualitative changes of equal extent. There is no cause and effect of digitisation. Thinking 
in terms of cause and effect is part of the false evolution of photography. The other part is 
thinking in terms of endpoints.5 Photography does not culminate in anything, including the 
variously named phenomenon of ubiquitous computing (or ambient intelligence, pervasive 
computing, intelligent media) – even if its invisibility as a technology is being enhanced. 
Photography does not have a teleology, although it might have a genealogy in as far as it 
continues to highlight aspects of its past as it evolves: 
What is new about new media comes from the particular ways in which they refashion 
older media and the ways in which older media refashion themselves to answer to the 
challenges of new media. 
(Bolter and Grusin 15) 
 
 
Strictly speaking, Bolter and Grusin’s concept of remediation reduces the designation of new 
media to an oxymoron. There is no new media without old media: remediation is the structural 
condition of all media. The oxymoron is clearly lost on those who maintain that there is a 
language of new media (Manovich) which is distinguishable from the language of old media. The 
idea, for example, that the code, the algorithm or the pixel has ‘substituted’ for the image – rather 
than engaged in a relationship of continuity and transformation with it – is technologically 
deterministic, and entirely false. It is false in that it divides the technological aspect of the 
medium from all others. It is also false in that it equates technological convergence with 
revolutionary progress towards an ultimate goal: 
Today we are in the middle of a new media revolution – the shift of all culture to 
computer-mediated forms of production, distribution, and communication. 
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 (Manovich 19) 
Manovich argues that as a result of the (technological) convergence between media and the 
computer, ‘all existing media are translated into numerical data accessible for the computer’ (25). 
In other words, media cease to constitute differences in degree, let alone in kind. They lose their 
social and economic, along with their technological specificity, and their history is dissolved into 
data: ‘in short, media become new media’ (25), and new media are defined without reference to 
remediation. Compare Manovich’s definition of new media with that of Martin Lister et. al.: 
The Internet, Websites, computer multimedia, computer games, CD-ROMS and DVD, 
virtual reality. 
 (Manovich 19) 
 
Those methods and social practices of communication, representation and expression that 
have developed using the digital, multimedia, networked computer and the ways that this 
machine is held to have transformed work in other media: from books to movies, from 
telephones to television. 
 (Lister et. al. 2) 
For Manovich, there are no books or movies, no telephones or television. There is only ‘computer 
culture’, for which we need computer science – in place of media theories (46, 48).  
 
Most media theories assume that there has been a degree of convergence between media and 
computer/information technologies, although there is a dispute about the prominence of 
technological, economic or cultural convergence (Murdock). For Bolter and Grusin, convergence 
is, in any case, a synonym for remediation that occurs not just between old and new forms of one 
medium, but between all media: 
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No medium today, and certainly no single media event, seems to do its cultural work in 
isolation from other media, any more than it works in isolation from other social and 
economic forces. 
(Bolter and Grusin 15) 
However, the picture is a little more complex than this. Our media ecology is part of, and 
inseparable from, a wider ecology of cultural and technological forms. In as far as there has been 
a degree of convergence between media and information technologies, there has also been a 
degree of convergence between media, information and biotechnologies. The contemporary 
condition of various media is no longer separate, if it ever was, from the contemporary condition 
of technoscience. To this extent, (new) media studies needs to be joined, though not replaced by 
STS (Kember, ‘Doing technoscience as (‘new’) media’).  
  
As a result of the biologisation of technology (cybernetics, artificial intelligence, artificial life) 
and the technologisation of biology (genetic engineering), ‘there is almost nothing you can do 
these days that does not require literacy in biology’ (Haraway 26). That includes understanding 
photography from the inside and from the outside. The conditions of photography are entangled 
with those of the ‘new’ biology – biology ‘woven in and through information technologies and 
systems’ (26). Photographs, like the forms of artificial intelligence and artificial life, have the 
capacity to appear relatively autonomous, animated and agential. They can seem life-like in a way 
that the introduction of digital photo frames is presently only hinting at, and there is no reason 
why they should not correspond to the criteria for life established within the field of artificial life: 
self-organisation, self-replication, evolution, autonomy and emergence (Boden). But despite, or 
rather because of this reduction of life to computational criteria; because of the problems of 
mechanism and finalism (Bergson Creative Evolution)
6 which undermine the vitality of 
evolutionism, rendering it false (Kember ‘Creative Evolution?’), photographs can only seem life-
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like. Photographs can never become life-like. Their apparent vitality is simply a mask for their 
enhanced social and economic utility.  
 
 
The Essence of Photography – Object and Method; Memory and Intuition 
Photographs can never become life-like, but photography already is. It is not (techno)science or 
the intellect that reveals this to us, but intuition as a method, and as a biological, not a 
psychological tendency: 
It is not a psychological process or skill, nor a personal accomplishment, but one of the 
biological contingencies that mark all of life, a tendency, more or less active or dormant, 
whose function is not synthesis but an acknowledgement of a mode of belonging to, 
immersion in, being part of a larger whole…  
(Grosz 237)  
Intuition brings us into direct contact ‘or community’ with the object. It offers ‘a provisional 
coincidence with it that precludes projection, mastery, or judgement’ (237). In Bergson’s words: 
We call intuition here the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an 
object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. 
(in Grosz 237)  
 
The intellectual tendency constitutes an evolutionary divergence from the intuitive tendency, 
especially, perhaps, in humans. Its purpose is to know and represent, in order to act and intervene 
in the material world. This is a world which the intellect perceives to be divided spatially into 
discrete entities or things, which may succeed each other, but do not in themselves change. From 
an intellectual point of view, the material world, reality itself, is inert. This, for Bergson, is a 
fundamental misconception. Contrary to being inert, reality is a continuous process of becoming. 
The intellect, as it culminates in science, cannot know, or represent reality as movement (or time). 
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It can only misrepresent it as stasis (or space). It does this on the basis of evidence provided by 
the primary sense of sight, and although the knowledge it produces is, strictly speaking, 
inaccurate, it is nevertheless useful. The view of reality as a succession of solid things ‘serves our 
ends’ (Wildon Carr 23). By conceiving only of things, and the relations between things, we are 
able to manipulate them, adapt them, and control them – albeit at the cost of imagining ourselves 
to be separate, or distinct from them. If intuition is a kind of bond that connects us to reality, 
‘intelligence is essentially external; it makes us regard reality as something other than our life, as 
something hostile that we may overcome’ (44). Photographs are part of that attitude to reality 
when they are used, or utilised, as intellectual artefacts. But as Barthes demonstrated in his 
discussion of the studium and punctum, photographs are always, potentially, more than that. They 
can provoke, be disturbed by, a very different attitude. Both are integral to photography.  
 
Intuition is akin to instinct, and in evolutionary terms, it is actually instinct from which the 
intellect has diverged. Instinct is the unconscious bond with reality that provokes bodily action 
and reaction in all animals, but perhaps least of all in humans. If instinct has atrophied as human 
intelligence has evolved, then intuition is the means by which Bergson ‘seeks a way of returning 
each to the other’ (Grosz 234). Intuition ‘is in contrast to the defiant attitude that we seem to 
assume when in science we treat facts and things as outside, external, discrete existences, which 
we range before us, analyse, discriminate, break up and recombine’ (Wildon Carr 45). All of 
philosophy recognises it, but not necessarily with the same emphasis as Bergson. For him, it is 
the means by which intelligence may become attuned to itself and to the flow of reality. 
Paradoxically, but precisely, intuition is method reconciled with immediacy, science reconciled 
with life. It does not constitute life, or duration, itself, but ‘is rather the movement by which we 
emerge from our own duration… to affirm and immediately to recognize the existence of other 
durations…’ (Deleuze 33). It is no more a method of division than it is of reconciliation. Above 
all though, intuition is a ‘temporalizing’ (Deleuze 35), not a spatialising method: 
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For intuition the essential is change: as for the thing, as intelligence understands it, it is a 
cutting which has been made out of the becoming and set up by our mind as a substitute 
for the whole… Intuition, bound up to duration, which is growth, perceives in it an 
uninterrupted continuity of unforseen novelty. 
 (Bergson in Grosz 236)  
 
Intuition is literally useless. It has no utility. Its domain is that of philosophy, not science, and it 
promotes an entirely different kind of understanding that Bergson calls ‘aesthetic’. It is not 
exactly anti-science, or anti-intellectual, but it revises science and the intellect – from within. 
Only in this way does it have anything to offer to contemporary theory. At the same time, it 
constitutes a real challenge to theory by foregoing ‘ready-made categories and concepts’, and 
seeking those ‘uniquely tailored to the object alone’ (Grosz 236). Since theory can only deal with 
ready-mades, and as I will attempt to demonstrate: intuition, necessarily, challenges theory 
through practice. It is a form of understanding which is inseparable from doing. It is not just a 
method, or technique, but a methodology. Whether or not it can be accepted as a refined 
empiricism, as Bergson proposes, it operates ‘underneath the cuts… that intelligence imposes’, 
and draws attention to interconnectedness, entanglement, or ‘the fact that things do not occur in 
[spatial] isolation from other things but are bound together in a continually changing series of 
streams that form a dynamic and continuous whole’ (Grosz 238). Intuition gives us fleeting 
access, which is just like the opening and closing of a shutter, to this movement.  
 
Movement, then, is vital to photography. It is what is vital in photography. But if it is not in the 
actual photograph, where is it? It exists virtually, which is to say, it exists as the temporality of 
photography, not in any of its apparent spaces: frame, print, screen or archive. It certainly does 
not exist in an imaginary succession of states ‘from’ analogue ‘to’ digital, ‘from’ film ‘to’ code, 
and so on. If photography can be understood as a phenomenon of creative evolution, or as the 
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invention of forms ever new (Bergson, Creative Evolution ), then those forms are not 
technological, or rather, technology is a form of life (Heidegger). We, as subjects,7 can 
comprehend this form of life intellectually or intuitively. These, for Bergson, are our two ways of 
knowing. One immobilises movement, and takes us away from life to its representation, and the 
other truly sees movement, and thereby connects us with life. ‘The first reveals itself most clearly 
in its manipulations of matter; the second expresses itself most directly in the subject’s own inner 
cohesion’ (Grosz 239). Intuition expresses itself most directly in relation to mind, not matter. It is 
a form of ‘pure’ perception (Bergson, Matter and Memory 84) which enables us, as mindful 
subjects, to connect with the object world as it moves and lives. It is not itself that which moves 
and lives in the subject. It is simply a form of perception that stems from, and feeds back to that 
which does move and live in the mindful subject; namely, memory. Intuition is that which 
literally connects the temporality of the subject (memory), with that of the object (photography).  
 
There are two forms of memory, and these constitute a difference in kind. One has more to do 
with habit, or repeated actions (we remember how to do things, like read, or drive), and the other 
is concerned with the unique, unrepeatable event (Bergson, Matter and Memory). Photography, as 
memory, already constitutes within itself (as a difference in kind) these differences in kind.
8 In 
other words; photography is both habitual, and eventful. Barthes was clearly more interested in 
the event – in what ‘has occurred only once… the Real, in its indefatigable expression’ (4) – and 
so was Bergson. It might also be said that both were interested in the process, or progress of 
memory from ‘pure memory’ (memory as event), to ‘memory-image’, to perception. These do not 
consist of successive states, because they are not, in fact, separate. Bergson’s discussion of the 
inseparability of memory, image and perception goes some way towards helping us understand 
Barthes’ engagement with photography by means of the Winter Garden Photograph: 
Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period in our history, 
we become conscious of an act sui generis by which we detach ourselves from the 
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present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then in a certain region of 
the past – a work of adjustment, something like the focussing of a camera. But our 
recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting 
the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud; from 
the virtual state it passes into the actual; and as its outlines become more distinct and its 
surface takes on colour, it tends to imitate perception. But it remains attached to the past 
by its deepest roots, and if, when once realized, it did not retain something of its original 
virtuality, if, being a present state, it were not also something which stands out distinct 
from the present, we should never know it for a memory. 
(Bergson, Matter and Memory 171) 
Here, the image mediates between memory and perception, the virtual and the actual, the past and 
the present. Properly speaking, it constitutes both kinds. But once memory has been actualised, 
there is no going back. Barthes might know the Winter Garden Photograph for a memory, but 
the memory (pure) is not in the image. ‘To picture is not to remember’ (173), but to perceive.  
 
 
Intuition and Affect, Memory and Perception 
When Barthes decided to make himself the measure of photographic knowledge, he famously 
asked: ‘what does my body know of Photography?’ (9). It might be said that in asking this 
particular question, Barthes circumscribed, if he did not actually determine, the answer he would 
get. The body, according to Bergson, knows nothing of memory, but rather more about sensations 
and actions (179). Memory creates sensations as it materialises, ‘but at that very moment’ it 
ceases to be memory, and becomes something else, something present, ‘something actually lived’ 
(179). More than anything, Barthes wanted the experience of his mother to be something actually 
lived. What he sought, through photography, was not pure memory, but materialised memory: 
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The function of the body is not to store up recollections, but simply to choose, in order to 
bring back to distinct consciousness, by the real efficacy thus conferred on it, the useful 
memory, that which may complete and illuminate the present situation with a view to 
ultimate action. 
       (Bergson, Matter and Memory 233)  
The present situation, for Barthes, was that of intolerable grief. The ultimate (bodily) action for 
him, as for all of us, is death.  
 
Barthes describes how he found the Winter Garden Photograph ‘by moving back through Time’ 
(71), starting with her most recent image, and ending with the image of her as a child. He 
explains how he experienced that same movement in reality. Barthes nursed his mother while she 
was weak, and dying. She became ‘my little girl, uniting for me with that essential child she was 
in her first photograph’ (72). The essential child was strong, not weak, living not dying, and 
Barthes found that ‘I who had not procreated… had, in her very illness, engendered my mother’ 
(72). As such, he was fulfilling the terms of a life, of life itself; of procreation and succession. 
But: 
Once she was dead I no longer had any reason to attune myself to the progress of the 
superior Life Force (the race, the species). My particularity could never again 
universalize itself… From now on I could do no more than await my total, undialectical 
death. 
          (Barthes 72) 
 
Just as his death is undialectical, so, for Barthes, is ‘the Photograph – my Photograph’. Dialectic 
‘is that thought which masters the corruptible and converts the negation of death into the power to 
work’ (90). But here, there is no conversion, no negation; no power. Barthes cannot escape from 
the photograph in which he brought his mother to a life that neither he, nor she, could sustain. In 
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engendering her, he was ‘losing her twice over’ (71). He finds himself alone again, in front of the 
image: 
I suffer, motionless. Cruel, sterile deficiency: I cannot transform my grief, I cannot let my 
gaze drift; no culture will help me utter this suffering which I experience entirely on the 
level of the image’s finitude. 
          (Barthes 90)  
He is caught, trapped, ‘arrested’ in this image; in its finitude, its ‘unendurable plenitude’; its 
actuality. His memory has materialised and there is no going back. There is no more memory – 
the photograph is ‘never, in essence, a memory’ (91) – there is only ‘the exhorbitant thing’. 
Barthes muses at length on the relationship between the photograph and death, and on the painful 
irony of his photograph ‘which produces Death while trying to preserve life’ (92). Just like ‘all 
those young photographers… determined upon the capture of actuality’, Barthes did not know 
that he would become an agent of death (92). Or rather, he found out what his body knew of 
photography. His body transformed memory into sensation, action and perception. It took him 
away from the virtual life of photography to the actual death of the photograph. If he had asked a 
different question, or stayed with his original question, concerning the essence of photography, he 
would have got a different answer.  
 
The first rule of intuition as a method ‘concerns the stating and creating of problems’. The second 
concerns ‘the discovery of genuine differences in kind’, and the third is about ‘the apprehension 
of real time’ (Deleuze 14). Due to the false problems that have obscured our understanding of 
photography, we still do not know what photography is. Because we do not know what 
photography is, we must start with the primary, ontological question: ‘what is photography?’ 
Having asked, and seemingly answered this question (photography is an invisible medium in 
which the referent adheres), Barthes then asks a secondary, phenomenological question: ‘what 
does my body know of photography?’ This question is driven by a subjective desire to feel, to be 
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affected by the presence of his mother, and it leads him, as I have shown, away from photography 
to the photograph. Affect, then, as Barthes’ method, cannot address the question of ontology, and 
is already a compromise with (classical) phenomenology, which does not deal with desire or 
mourning (21). Ultimately, affect produces a branching off from ontology as ‘theme’, towards 
phenomenology as ‘wound’. If affect produces another false problem for photography, it is that of 
sentimentality (21).  
 
However, it is fairer to say that affect is no more equated with sentimentality than intuition is with 
sympathy. As methods (and methodologies), they are simply the means for answering different 
questions. Neither question is wholly subjective or objective, and both methods reveal a genuine 
difference in kind. Affect reveals the existence of matter in perception, and intuition reveals the 
existence of spirit in memory. The material referent, the real, is only present – actual – in the 
image as it is perceived. It may be brought to life in a moment of pure perception (intuition) or 
pure sensation (affect), but it is otherwise inert. The referent, Barthes’ mother, does not live in the 
photograph. She lives only in his memory, and as spirit, not matter. By materialising his memory 
of her in the Winter Garden Photograph, in order to experience her presence affectively, Barthes 
effectively destroys it. He destroys memory principally by depriving it of movement.  
 
The third rule of intuition is the most fundamental one: ‘intuition presupposes duration, it consists 
in thinking in terms of duration’ (Deleuze 31). Affect, on the other hand, does not. Intuition, 
rather than affect, would have lead Barthes to see, in the Winter Garden Photograph, not so much 
the stubborn adherence of the referent, but more of its, her, virtuality and therefore vitality. 
Intuition would have enabled him to know his recollection for a memory. It would also have 
returned him from the photograph, to photography, and thereby rejoined material with spiritual 
existence. It is only in the realm of photography as (living) memory that Barthes could really 
have encountered his mother after she had died. Photography is not an invisible medium, but its 
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mode is other than that of perception. We see photography, or photographically, when we ‘see’, 
or rather apprehend, duration in an instant.9  
 
 
Conclusion. Applying the Method 
Photography apprehends duration in an instant, as if it intuits it. Intuition is a return, each to the 
other, of instinct and the intellect. As such, it is always already integral to our ways of 
understanding and doing, our forms of theory and practice. Indeed, we could regard Barthes’ 
theory-practice of affect as a divergence from intuition, and it is certainly possible to detect 
intuition at work, intuition in the work of that most intellectual of (photography) theorists; Susan 
Sontag. If intuition works like a moment of insight that moves theory on (Grosz 237), then Sontag 
intuited both the condition of photography – ‘it is mainly a social rite, a defence against anxiety, 
and a tool of power’ (8) – and its ontology as an event.
10 The problem is, as I re-stated at the 
beginning of this essay, that theory has not moved on for some time, and this is due to our over-
reliance on intellect as the dominant, and perhaps increasingly dominating tendency.  
 
Perhaps what we need to do is take bigger, better or just longer ‘leaps’ in to ‘the movement of 
what is new’ (Grosz 236), and out of what is intellectually familiar, but which nevertheless must 
be fed back to the intellect, and to intellectual knowledge, ‘because it cannot represent itself’ 
[my emphasis] (237). Or perhaps this is just part of the problem. This is what leads to the 
conceptual containment of potential forms of life and science. This is what turns theory-as-it-
could-be back into theory-as-we-know-it. Perhaps what we really need to do is become a little 
less reliant on our intellects and their ritual, defensive tools of power. We need to defer to them 
less, and challenge them more, by recognising, for a start, that they do not, and cannot, act alone. 
Our mode of understanding is both scientific and aesthetic, both exterior and interior. Intellect 
and intuition exist only in terms of their relationality. They are not self-identical, but they remain 
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differences in kind. What this means, is that neither one can ever illustrate, explain, or be 
assimilated to the other. Our over-reliance then, is just that. It is a habit, and our intuition is still 
there, if we want to use it. This doesn’t mean that we can make it useful – except by recognising 
its non-utilitarian existence. What better way of puncturing the banal, repetitive and arrogant 
insistence that the world can, and will be explained? If intuition works like a moment of insight 
that moves theory on, it moves theory on by compromising it, even as it is itself compromised. 
Intuition does not need to represent itself in order for its presence to be felt.  
 
Intuition accentuates the temporal rather than spatial, the internal rather than external aspect of 
photography. It is a different way of knowing (it), that does not confirm our perception, and 
‘takes us beyond the human condition’ (Pearson 3) to the condition of multiplicity, or of all 
potential differences in kind. To apprehend a figure photographically, rather than to see a figure 
in a photograph, entails understanding that ‘at any moment in our lives we are neither simply one 
nor many but an unfolding and enfolding virtual multiplicity: the time of our lives is both 
continuous and heterogeneous’ (5). Photography as memory rather than perception, as something 
virtual rather than actual, takes us beyond our own experience, to ‘experience enlarged and gone 
beyond’ (8).  
 
 
Notes 
1. Although I’m referring here to an ‘aesthetic’ rather than scientific understanding of 
photography, it is worth bearing in mind that photography itself has been a medium of 
both. It has been associated, for a significant part of its history, with the problems of 
scientific realism, or with the invisible conjunction of knowledge and power.  
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2. Keith Ansell Pearson identifies the virtual as ‘a productive power of difference, a 
simplicity and potentiality, which denotes neither a deficient nor an inadequate mode of 
being’ (2002: 1).  
3. Our psychological, and social investments in photography, are due in part to the fact that 
it is a medium that confirms our perception of the world around us.  
4. In his founding paper on artificial life, Christopher Langton distinguishes between life-as-
we-know-it and life-as-it-could-be (in Boden, 1996).  
5. In Creative Evolution, Bergson uses the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘finalism’ (1988). 
6. Problems whereby life is regarded as the emergent effect of code, and human-like life is 
its ultimate evolutionary end-point.  
7. I have not offered a critique of Bergson’s concept of the subject here; a subject which 
would appear to be humanist (universal), but at the same time, a subject which cannot be 
fixed. 
8. Photography, as memory, is virtual, and ‘the virtual has the power to differ with itself’. It 
is not some vague idea, but rather it is the very concept of difference (Pearson, 2002: 5). 
9. In as far as Barthes did not know, or intuit, this, to what extent did Cartier-Bresson when 
he identified photography as the ‘decisive moment’? 
10. ‘The further back we go in history… , the less sharp is the distinction between images 
and real things…’ (155).  
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